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Abstract 
Since the 1980s, regional development policy in advanced economies has 
emphasised the promotion of endogenous development potentials within 
regions, with local/regional government playing a leading role in the creation 
of effective governance structures for mobilising these potentials. A key 
feature of this approach is the adoption of the city-region" as the organising 
unit for pursuing local/regional development. Ireland has not followed this 
lead, continuing to rely on external investment as the main engine of economic 
growth and failing to devolve highly centralised functions which could give 
local/regional government a more effective developmental role. This article 
argues that the 2012 Action Programme for Effective Local Government 
proposes a regional structure which is meaningless in terms of city-region 
development and fails to address the governance weaknesses which inhibit 
development at the regional and local levels. The action programme therefore 
ignores international best practice regarding how effective regional 
development should be pursued. 
Keywords: Endogenous development, governance structures, city-region, 
Action Programme for Effective Local Government 
Introduction: Early regional development policy 
The idea that national governments should address problems arising 
from spatial imbalances in levels of economic development first took 
hold in certain advanced economies in the 1930s, and subsequently 
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became a general feature of the interventionist welfare states which 
emerged throughout the Western world in the decades after the 
Second World War (Clout, 1980). The regional development policies 
that grew from thls typically focused on two main types of problem 
region (Brown & Burrows, 1977): 
i. once-prosperous industrial regions whose economic bases had 
experienced severe contraction, due to factors such as the 
exhaustion of the local natural resource base, technological 
change and the emergence of more effective competitor regions 
elsewhere; 
ii. peripheral rural regions which had never experienced 
industrialisation. 
There was a remarkable uniformity across national jurisdictions in the 
types of policy which were developed to address the economic 
development problems of such regions, regardless of the type of 
region involved (Bachtler & Yuill, 2001 ). They were typically delivered 
in a top-down manner by central governments and were applied in a 
standardised way to all problem regions, regardless of variations in 
local circumstances. These policies assumed that the regions in 
question lacked internal capital and entrepreneurial and material 
resources, and that these therefore n·eeded to be supplied from 
external sources, typically in the form of inward investment involving 
the establishment of manufacturing branch plants by externally based 
(and frequently transnational) firms. Standard incentive packages 
(involving combinations of capital grants, tax breaks and labour 
subsidies) were offered in order to induce such firms to invest in the 
regions in question. These incentives were accompanied by 
infrastructural investments (mainly in roads, transport and 
communications links, and industrial parks and buildings) to help 
mitigate the extra costs that were assumed to apply to operating in the 
target problem regions. 
Ireland represented an almost extreme example of this approach to 
regional development. In Ireland, as elsewhere, government attention 
to regional policy issues has waxed and waned over time, typically 
coming to the fore during periods of economic expansion and being 
moved to the political backburner.during recessionary periods. When 
in vogue, regional policy has been driven by two principal 
considerations. The first of these has been to direct development away 
from the Dublin region and towards the less-developed western parts 
of the country. This was reflected in the state's first formal regional 
• 
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policy measure, the Undeveloped Areas Act of 1952, which provided 
capital grants to industries locating in the 'Undeveloped Areas' 
(subsequently re-titled 'Designated Areas') of the west. While the 
industrial grants scheme was extended to the entire country in the mid 
1950s, higher grant levels were available in the west. The second main 
influence on regional policy has been the intense localism of Irish 
politics, which engendered a powerful impetus towards a widespread 
dispersal of state-assisted job-creation projects (Breathnach, 2010). 
With Ireland becoming strongly dependent on inward investment as 
the main driver of economic growth nationally from the late 1950s, 
foreign manufacturing plants became the key vehicle for delivering 
dispersed industrial employment. This dispersal policy (initially 
pursued on an informal basis) reached its zenith under the IDA 
Regional Industrial Plans in the 1970s, when a combination of a surge 
of inward investment following EEC entry and a major programme of 
advance factory construction saw virtually every town in Ireland of any 
size being in receipt of a foreign branch plant. Combined with 
substantial job losses in established indigenous industry in the main 
cities, this led to a remarkable degree of inter-regional equalisation in 
the ratio of manufacturing employment to population (Breathnach, 
1982). 
Despite this apparent short-term success, in the longer term the 
spatial dispersal policy proved unsustainable. In this, Ireland shared 
the same experience as other countries that applied similar policies. 
Basically, the kinds of branch plant attracted to Ireland's peripheral 
regions did not provide an economic base upon which long-term, self-
sustaining development could be built (Breathnach, 1993; O'Malley, 
1989; Telesis Consultancy Group, 1982). They typically involved low-
skill activities, which did not contribute to skill upgrading in target 
regions. This was accompanied by relatively low pay levels, which 
contributed to further widening of the income gap with core regions. 
Branch plants made very few local input purchases, while the partial 
and routine nature of their activities meant there was little useful 
technology transfer to local firms or workers. There was also little 
local reinvestment of profits, the key to sustained economic growth. 
All of these features, plus the fact that, frequently, much of the 
capital cost involved was not borne by the firms concerned, meant that 
(as in other countries pursuing a similar development approach) 
branch plants were not embedded in the regions where they were 
located, so they were easy to close or relocate, especially in times of 
economic recession or as part of reorganisation/rationalisation 
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programmes on the part of the parent companies of the branch plants 
in question (Dicken et al., 1994; Throk, 1993). 
Because of the limited long-term economic impact of branch plants 
and their high turnover, branch plant industrialisation was seen as an 
inefficient use of public funding. It was also seen as wasteful in that its 
centralised and standardised approach made little use of local 
resources and failed to target specific local needs, which varied 
between regions. For example, this approach offered few oppor-
tunities in lagging regions for skilled workers and potential 
entrepreneurs, who typically chose to migrate to metropolitan regions, 
whether at home or abroad. 
In Ireland many of the branch plants established in the 1960s and 
1970s had already begun to close/contract in the recessionary 1980s, 
and very few (apart from those in the pharmaceuticals sector) are still 
in operation today. However, the spectacular success of branch plant 
industrialisation in the 1970s was to leave a negative long-term legacy 
in two major respects: 
i. Economic policy became fixated on the attraction of foreign 
investment, with the result that the development of indigenous ' 
industry was marginalised. Calls for a reversal of this situation , 
were made in two government-sponsored reports on industrial 
policy, the Telesis report (Telesis Consultancy Group, 1982) and 
the Culliton report (Industrial Policy Review Group, 1992). 
However, these calls were largely ignored and, despite the 
establishment in 1994 of a separate agency to promote indigenous 
enterprise (now Enterprise Ireland), Ireland still lacks a coherent 
and strategic approach to the development of such enterprise. 
ii. The widespread dispersal of foreign branch plants around the 
country which occurred in the 1970s created an expectation 
among local communities that the government could continue to 
do the same, which is no longer the case. Apart from creating 
hostages to fortune for subsequent governments, this also had a 
dampening effect on local development capacity in Ireland as 
local communities came to assume that central government action 
would provide the solution for local economic problems. 
New approaches to regional development policy 
Ireland's response to the failure of branch plant industrialisation was 
very different from that in other Western countries (Albrechts et al., A 
' 
, 
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1989: Bachtler & Yuil~ 2001 ). Elsewhere, the common response was 
to place a much greater emphasis on the cultivation of endogenous 
capabilities as the key to economic development in lagging regions. 
Focusing on the identification and cultivation of local resources was 
seen as offering a more sustainable basis for long-term development. 
Addressing specific local needs and weaknesses was seen as 
constituting a more effective use of development funds and the 
energies of development agencies. A locally based approach to 
development facilitated networking between local firms, thereby 
facilitating the development of supply linkages and stimulating 
innovation via information-sharing. Also, a locally based, endogenous 
approach offered the prospect of a more flexible, coordinated and 
integrated approach to development involving all relevant local actors 
and stakeholders. 
A key element in the so-called 'new regionalism' (Keating, 1998) 
has been the assumption by local and regional government of the 
leading role in organising and driving development at the subnational 
level. In most countries this has been accompanied by devolution to 
these levels of the appropriate powers and functions for implementing 
this role. This was a further extension of an existing process of 
decentralisation whereby most Western governments devolved to 
regional and local government responsibility for delivering the 
increasing range and depth of public services made available in the 
post-war period. In Ireland, by contrast, the process occurred in the 
opposite direction: not only were new public services for the most part 
delivered centrally, but there was also a gradual process of centralising 
functions previously carried out at local government level (including 
responsibility for the health service, agricultural advisory services, 
national roads and, most recently, the public water supply). 
In spatial terms, a major feature of the new regionalism is its focus 
on the city-region (comprising a focal city and its adjacent functional 
hinterland) as its basic organisational construct (Breathnach, 2013; 
Robson et al., 2006). City-regions comprise territories wherein 
multiple (and frequently interlinked) spatial systems are simul-
taneously articulated, embracing such activities as commuting, supply 
of consumer and public services, transportation, communication, 
contact networks and production chain linkages; they therefore 
constitute the most appropriate spatial units for integrated socio-
economic and environmental planning. This again marks a major 
departure from the earlier model of top-down regional development 
policy, which tended to focus on regions defined by common 
characteristics. such as low income and high unemployment rather 
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than their internal structural coherence. The Irish Designated Areas, 
the British Development Areas and the Italian Mezzogiorno provide 
good examples of the latter. 
The utilisation of city-regions as the basic building block for 
regional development is a key element of the European Spatial 
Development Perspective (ESDP), a framework for spatial planning 
adopted by the EU member states (including Ireland) in 1999 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1999). The ESDP 
argued that the most effective way of promoting regional development 
within the EU involved building development around the main 
regional cities, not as stand-alone entities but as organising centres for 
the mobilisation of their surrounding regions. This involved 
strengthening the links between cities and their hinterlands via the 
medium of a shared and integrated development strategy. The focal 
urban centre in each city-region should act as a 'gateway' through 
which the region's interactions (i.e. flows of goods, people, money, 
information, etc.) with the outside world would be channelled. 
A good definition of the gateway concept, as envisaged by the 
ESDP is provided in Ireland's National Development Plan 2000-2006: 
'the common attribute of Gateways is that they are centres which are 
1
1 
'
·. strategically placed to drive growth in their zones of influence, 
generating a dynamic of development which embraces the com-
plementarity between city, town, village'and country' (Government of 
Ireland, 1999, p. 43). 
Governance structures for effective endogenous local/regional 
development 
Accompanying the growing focus on city-regions as actual or potential 
drivers of growth has been a corresponding movement towards the 
creation of new governance structures to drive the development 
process (Keating, 1998; Pike et a1., 2006). Governance can be defined 
as the set of rules and the institutions which control and coordinate 
activity in society and the economy. These combine tbe legally based 
regulatory functions of the government sector and the norms and rules 
established in the non-government sector. 
Governance structures for effective bottom-up endogenous 
development provide a platform for involving the key regional 
stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of agreed i 
and commonly shared development strategies and programmes. 1 
'JYpically these stakeholders include elected representatives, l 
government functionaries, the private sector and a range of voluntary ~ 
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(not-for-profit) organisations such as trade unions, business 
associations and conununity/environmental groups. Creating effective 
collaborative partnerships from such a diverse range of interest groups 
poses a major challenge: 
Regional co-ordination... requires the politicians and 
administrators to adopt a view on government and planning that 
puts emphasis on co-operation across administrative tiers and 
sectors and between public, private and organized interest 
groups, thereby taking into account that different issues call for 
different alliances with different spatial competencies and 
different life spans ... Putting such multi-level governance into 
practice is a complex task, even if politicians and administrators 
agree on its usefulness. (Meijers & Romein, 2003, p. 182) 
However, where effectively organised, such 'development coalitions', 
it is argued, have the capacity to transcend sectional and geographical 
interests, mobilise cross-community support for development 
objectives and facilitate coordinated action in pursuit of these 
objectives (Keating, 1998). 
Among the factors which play a key role in building effective 
regional governance structures (Breathnach, 2013; Jones, 2001; 
Keating, 2001; Meijers & Romain, 2003) are: 
• the extent to which the regional economy possesses functional 
coherence (usually the case where the regional economy comprises 
a focal city and its associated functional hinterland); 
• the extent to which political structures within the region are 
cohesive or fragmented; 
• the extent to which the key actors within the region have local 
control over intra-regional activities; 
• the availability of leadership and organisational ability within the 
region. 
A recent OECD report (Clark et al., 2010) pointed to the leading role 
frequently played by local/regional government in promoting 
successful development at regional and subregional levels) The key 
role in this respect is the provision of leadership in building 
1 These levels are not mutually exclusive; for example, the ESDP argues strongly that 
the long-term development of particular localities is best pursued through participation 
in coordinated development strategies organised at regional level (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1999). 
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development coalitions and collaborative networks among relevant 
actors. This includes creating a long-term vision for how the region 
should develop; promoting strategic tbinking in terms of how this 
vision can be realised; setting goals for action in relation to vision 
realisation; communicating its vision and aspirations to regional 
stakeholders and ensuring that all stakeholders are informed about, 
and involved in, the actions being taken in pursuit of regional goals; 
and building trust and alliance between the various stakeholders, 
tbereby ensuring tbeir full commitment to the development effort. 
Other major roles played by local government include providing high-
quality services and infrastructure and coordinating the contribution 
to the development effort of all relevant public sector agencies 
(municipal, regional and national). 
In order to perform this role effectively, local/regional government 
requires appropriate authority and status. The crucial importance of 
the devolution of relevant powers to the local/regional level for 
effective regional development is widely recognised in the 
international literature, as reflected in tbe following sample of 
quotations: 
The experiences of a number of states with a variety of 
constitutional forms ... show that a more devolved structure of 
governance promotes economic growth and development. 
(Danson et al., 1997, p. 15) 
Ultimately... regional policy must be about decentralising 
economic and political power to the regions. (Martin & Minns, 
1995, p. 143) 
The transfer of powers to regional government [in Italy] has 
helped to increase the competitiveness of the territorial and 
urban systems. It is also behind tbe development of new forms of 
regional partnership and contractualization involving private 
and public sector players and increasing tbe efficiency of regional 
and local government. (Governa & Salone, 2005, p. 278) 
The absence of these requisites, as we shall see, acts as a profound 
barrier to the regional development process in Ireland. 
Competitiveness: The regional dimension 
Thinking in relation to the 'new regionalism' was strongly influenced 
by the publication, in 1990, of Michael Porter's path-breaking book 
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The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Porter, 1990). This book arose 
from a major international survey conducted by Porter, who was 
seeking to identify the key ingredients which conferred competitive 
advantage on particular countries. Porter found that, rather than 
individual countries being competitive across the range of economic 
activities, they tend to be competitive in particular industries. 
Furthermore, these iodustries in turn tend to be concentrated within 
particular regions, and even sub-regions, within the countries 
concerned. Porter used the term 'industrial clusters' to describe such 
local concentrations of firms in a particular industry, and described, at 
great length, the way in which local interaction between firms io a 
particular industry created a growth dynamic, particularly through 
enhancing innovation, which Porter saw as the crucial ingredient in 
becoming internationally competitive. Agaio, Porter identified as a 
common feature in the emergence of successful clusters the role 
played by local/regional government in providing leadership, 
facilitatiog interaction between firms and providing key services and 
infrastructure. 
The 1992 Culliton report on iodustrial policy (Industrial Policy 
Review Group, 1992) was strongly influenced by Porter's work, and 
recommended that the new agency responsible for promoting 
iodigenous enterprise (whose establishment was proposed io the 
report) should pursue a policy of cluster cultivation and should be 
organised along regional lines in order to facilitate this. This approach 
was further endorsed by a subsequent report by the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC), which argued the case for a 
national programme for promoting networks between iodigenous Irish 
firms (Cooke, 1996). Such networks, the report argued, would help 
Irish firms overcome their small individual scale and would provide 
the building blocks for the formation of iodustrial clusters. 
However, in accepting the Culliton report's proposal for the 
establishment of a separate development agency for indigenous 
iodustry, the then Minister for Enterprise and Employment, Ruairf 
Quinn, poiotedly stated that the new agency would not be organised 
on a regional basis, without giving any reason for this departure from 
what the Culliton report proposed. And indeed the agency which 
emerged from this recommendation (ioitially Forbairt and now 
Enterprise Ireland) has steadfastly refused to pursue, since its 
establishment, any kind of strategic sectoral or regional policy, 
focusing iostead almost exclusively on providing supports to individual 
firms. We had here a foretaste of the antipathy to regional devolution 
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on the part of Ireland's central state which was to undermine the 
National Spatial Strategy (NSS) following its introduction ten years 
later and which continues to bedevil Irish regional policy right up to 
today. 
The National Spatial Strategy 
The Culliton report had been commissioned in response to the poor 
employment performance of the manufacturing sector, including the 
foreign sector, during the 1980s. As mentioned already, one of its key 
recommendations was the need to give much higher priority to the 
development of the indigenous industrial sector. However, the 
prospects of this transpiring were sidetracked by the emergence of a 
new surge of inward investment that commenced in 1993 (the year 
after the Culliton report was published) and ushered in the Celtic tiger 
era. 
While the Celtic tiger era had the effect of greatly raising national 
productivity and income levels, it brought with it new regional 
problems. The new types of inward investment which materialised in 
the 1990s involved much higher skill levels compared with the 
investment which characterised the 1960s and 1970s. Perhaps even 
more significantly, a rapidly growing share of the new investment was 
in export services activities, including software, financial services and 
back-office activities. These activities have grown to the extent that 
they now account for one-half of total exports and continue to grow 
strongly, despite the recent recession. The higher skill levels of the new 
investment means it is much more selective in terms of where it wishes 
to locate, with a particular focus on larger urban centres, where 
sufficient pools of suitably skilled workers can be accessed. Service 
activities, in particular, have a strong preference for large urban 
locations, and indeed two-thirds of all employment in state-assisted 
export services firms were located in Dublin City and County in 2005 
(Forf;is, 2006a). 
A further factor promoting the location by foreign investment in 
larger urban centres has been the large size of many of the investments 
in question: in 2011, of the 1,100 foreign firms operating in Ireland, 55 
employed 500 or more workers. These firms, representing just 5 per 
cent of all foreign firms, accounted for 35 per cent of all employment 
in these firms. One-half of these large firms (most of which were 
services operations) were located in the Greater Dublin Area, with 
another 30 per cent located in the four main provincial centres 
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(information from the Forfiis 2011 survey of employment in state-
assisted firms, access to which was provided to the author by Forfas, 
the Irish government's advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, 
technology and innovation policy). 
Growing concerns about the increasing concentration of 
investment in the main urban centres, especially Dublin, along with 
the need for providing a national planning framework for coping with 
Ireland's rapid growth in the 1990s, provided the impetus for the 
preparation of the NSS, which was published in December 2002. The 
essential approach of the NSS was along the lines proposed by the 
ESDP, in that it aimed to achieve balanced regional development in 
Ireland through the focused cultivation of eight regional gateway cities 
(Figure 1 ). This involved the creation in these cities of a 'critical mass' 
of economic resources (a range of skills, innovation capacity, 
infrastructure and business services, and facilities) that would support 
self-sustaining growth. The gateways in turn would 'drive' economic 
development within their respective regions, thereby enabling each 
region to achieve its full 'development potential'. 
The NSS displayed an awareness of the governance processes 
associated with the 'new regionalism' model. It stated that 
'Partnerships between local and national government and the private 
sector should be established to facilitate planning for. the future roles 
of the new gateways proposed by the NSS' (Government of Ireland, 
2002, p. 117) and, in similar vein, that 'Joint development groups ... 
should be established between the relevant local, regional and 
government bodies, in partnership with local elected representatives 
and community interests' (p. 124). It identified, as a key step in the 
strategy-implementation process, the 'mobilisation of the appropriate 
civic, business and community interests to establish a consensus' on 
development objectives in the different gateways and issued 'a call for 
action by all relevant stakeholders to work in partnership and with 
enthusiasm to achieve an enhanced role for gateways ... and their 
broader regions' (p. 123). 
However, the NSS failed to address the fact that existing 
governance structures were incapable of creating the envisaged 
regional development coalitions, as demonstrated in the following 
quotation from Michael J. Bannon, former Professor of Urban and 
Regional Planning at University College Dublin: 
Ireland is characterised by its very high level of centralised 
administrative control, with limited institutional development at 
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Figure 1: Ireland's NUTS3 regions aud NSS gateways 
Counties 
Regions 
Gateways 
0 50Mi. ,__ ___ _, 
0 80 Kms. 
the regionalleve~ aod an extensive network of local authorities 
which have a limited range of functions, lack adequate local 
resources and are strictly controlled by central government. 
(Baonon,2007,p.224) 
The primary problem here is the fact that regional governance 
institutions in Irelaod are virtually non-existent. There is a set of 
entities iu place called regional authorities (RAs ), relating to the 
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NUTS3 regions shown in Figure 1 (see also Figure 1 in O'Riordain & 
van Egeraat in this issue). One of the most obvious characteristics of 
these 'authorities' is that they do not possess any authority. They 
consist of delegates nominated by the local authorities within each 
region, assisted by a tiny support staff (average of less than five per 
RA). They were established in 1994 in response to an EU requirement 
that there should be some sort of regional representative structure in 
place to monitor, and advise the government on, expenditure of EU 
Structural Funds at regional level in Ireland. It is an indication of the 
status and credibility of the RAs that they were largely ignored or 
marginalised by the government departments and state agencies 
involved in dispensing structural funding, and therefore unable to 
effectively fulfil this remit (Fitzpatrick Associates, 1997). 
The RAs were also given some additional token functions. One of 
these was to coordinate the activities of central state agencies within 
the regions, and the press statement which originally announced the 
establishment of the RAs stated that the government had decided that 
all government departments and other state bodies would review their 
regional administrative structures with a view to aligning them with 
the RA boundaries. It is a testament to how seriously the government 
took this commitment that not only has such realignment never taken 
place but, within months of this announcement, the government 
itself announced plans for regional education boards and a regional 
circuit court structure which bore no relation to the existing RA 
boundaries. 
The RAs were given an additional function under the NSS, which 
was to produce regional planning guidelines to which local authorities 
within the regions were expected to align their own local development 
plans. However, in the absence of any powers to ensure such 
alignment, this essentially was yet another toothless function. 
There is a second regional administrative tier in Ireland arising 
from the division of the country in 1999 into two parts in terms of 
their eligibility for EU Structural Funding (see Figure 1 in O'Riordain 
& van Egeraat in this issue). The 'regional assemblies' established 
with respect to these regions have a set of functions similar to those 
of the RAs, in that their primary function is to monitor the functioning 
of the regional operational programmes that are part of the 
community support frameworks under which EU Structural Funds are 
disbursed to Ireland, and more generally to monitor and make 
proposals in relation to the general impact of EU funding in the 
two regions. Additional token functions include promoting 
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coordination in the provision of public services in the two regions (as 
with the RAs) and making public bodies aware of the regional 
implications of their policies and plans. The assemblies also have an 
administrative function in relation to the territorial cooperation 
programmes that are part of the EU's Cohesion Policy. The 
membership of the assemblies is made up of delegates from their 
constituent RAs. As can be seen, they have no executive functions and 
no active independent role in promoting development within their 
respective regions. 
In the absence of regional institutions with the capacity to 
effectively coordinate aod animate the mobilisation of regional actors 
around gateway development, the NSS, rather than proposing the 
establishment of snch institutions, relied instead on the local 
authorities within the region coming together on a voluntary basis to 
provide this function. However, achieving this was beset by all sorts of 
difficulties. The first of these is a deep-seated tradition of inter-county 
rivalry, rather than cooperation, in Ireland. An evaluation of the role 
of the RAs conducted by consultaots some years ago showed that 
while they could have had a useful role in articulating an overall vision 
for their regions, this was undermined by the fact that delegates , 
attending RA meetings saw it as their role to push the interests of their 
1 
respective local authorities. As a result, there was no culture of 
cooperation and consensus-building in the relations between the local 
delegates making up the authorities (Fitzpatrick Associates, 1997). 
While sporting affiliations (particularly relating to Gaelic games) 
have played an important role in stimulating strong inter-county 
rivalries in Ireland, other factors have also been at work in the 
politicaVadministrative arena. Thus, tensions exist between city 
councils seeking to expand their boundaries in order to keep pace with 
urban growth and adjoining county councils seeking to preserve their 
boundaries. Since the city councils in question are all designated 
gateway centres, such tensions create difficulties in promoting 
collaboration between gateways and adjoining jurisdictions, especially 
where there may be a perception that the main benefits of the NSS 
would be confined to the gateway cities themselves. Further difficulties 
arise from the fact that the regions which the gateways are meant to 
serve, being composed of crude groupings of counties, in many cases 
correspond poorly with the functional reach of the gateway centres in 
question, leading to weak or non-existent identification on the part of 
some counties with these centres. This would apply, for example, to 
County Kerry in relation to Cork City (in the case of the South-West ~ 
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region), and to much of Counties Mayo and Roscommon in relation to 
Galway City (West region). 
Despite these obstacles, the county and city councils in each region 
did manage to come together to create collaborative gateway 
implementation groups. However, the effectiveness of these groups 
was profoundly constrained by a further distinctive feature of the Irish 
local government system, i.e. its very limited range of functions and 
powers, and hence its ability to leverage action at local level. The 
functions of Irish county and city councils are largely confined to social 
housing, physical planning, maintenance of local roads, public libraries 
and the provision of environmental services and facilities. They have 
very limited roles in such key areas of everyday life as economic/ 
business development, education and training, health care, social 
welfare, public transport and communications. These are functions 
that are carried out, for the most part, by local government in other 
European countries. 
Furthermore, local government has little or no leverage over the 
central government departments and agencies which provide the latter 
functions. This has major implications for the capacity to achieve 
coordination in the provision of public services, which is a key 
ingredient in effective endogenous development. This situation is 
greatly exacerbated by the lack of collaboration and cooperation in 
Ireland between central government departments and agencies. This 
problem was highlighted in a recent evaluation of the Irish public 
service conducted by the OECD, which identified a major problem of 
fragmentation leading to a lack of 'coherence in policy development, 
implementation and service delivery' (OECD, 2008, p. 12). This 
applies at both national and subnationallevel where, as the OECD 
reported, local authorities 'have no responsibility for nationally 
provided services and limited, if any, levers to direct how national 
service providers actually operate' (OECD, 2008, p. 244). 
These problems had already been highlighted in a report on the 
implementation of the NSS, published in 2006 by Forfas (2006a). 
While noting continuing disquiet within the gateway cities relating to 
problems of cooperation between neighbouring councils, this report 
identified even more widespread concern relating to difficulties being 
experienced in achieving cooperation between local councils, on the 
one hand, and a wide range of government departments and agencies, 
on the other. 
This report also highlighted problems relating to another key 
ingredient of effective regional governance identified earlier, i.e. the 
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absence from the Irish regions of the kinds of leaders who, elsewhere, 
have played a key role in mobilising cross-community support in 
pursuit of shared regional objectives. As the report put it, the NSS 
gateways 'are not championed by their regions in any kind of popular 
or political way' (Forfiis, 2006b, p. 105). Again, this can be attributed, 
in large part, to the lack of effective governance structures at regional 
level and the inability of sub-regional local authorities to perform this 
role. 
Concerns relating to the governance arrangements for the NSS 
were subsequently aired by two other government advisory agencies. 
An assessment of the NSS in a 2008 report by NESC (which advises 
the Irish government on strategic economic development issues) 
concluded that 'The development of governance frameworks that will 
allow key actors in the gateways to take coordinated and effective 
action together is, probably, the greatest and most urgent challenge 
facing the implementation of the NSS' (NESC, 2008, p. xix). Noting 
how county loyalties can hinder the achievement of coordinated action 
on strategic regional issues, the report called for a 'recasting' of 
regional structures as a key ingredient in facilitating gateway 
development. 
The following year, in a report on the role of cities in national 
competitiveness, the National Competitiveness Council identified 
governance as 'the [emphasis added] key issue for managing urban 
growth and implementing policy actions to achieve competitiveness 
objectives' (National Competitiveness Council, 2009, p. 35), and 
highlighted the importance of a coordinated approach to tackling 
issues at the level of the city-region. Expressing concern that a lack of 
intra-regional cooperation could threaten the competitiveness of Irish 
cities, and echoing the sentiments of the NESC, the council suggested 
that more coherent governance might require the recasting of local 
authority boundaries. 
In 2010 Forfiis published a further report in which it expressed 
concern about the implications of the lack of progress in the 
implementation of the NSS for the development of regional 
competitiveness in Ireland (now almost halfway through its intended 
plan period). The report stressed the need for governance and 
leadership structures at the regional level that are efficient, flexible 
and open to cross-regional collaboration, and observed that 'the 
existing [administrative] structures are not constructed in a way that 
enables a strategic and coherent approach to the development of the 
regions' (Forfas, 2010, p. 6). It referred to conflicts between local 
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authorities within regions, low 'buy-in' to the gateway concept and 
problems arising from the fact that the functional hinterlands of 
gateways stretched across existing administrative boundaries. These 
problems, the report argued, 'negatively impacted on strategic and 
cohesive planning, development and delivery for the wider 
metropolitan areas' associated with the gateways (p. 7). It therefore 
recommended that a single body be designated with responsibility for 
the strategic development of the gateways, and acknowledged that this 
proposal had 'wide-ranging' implications for current and future 
political structures. 
The Action Programme for Effective Local Government 
These entreaties on the part of a range of its own advisory agencies 
appear to have made no impression on the Irish Government. This is 
reflected in the new regional structures proposed in the recently 
published Action Programme for Effective Local Government (Depart-
ment of the Environment, Community aod Local Government, 2012). 
The proposed new structures involve merging the existing RAs and 
regional assemblies to form three new regions - Eastern and 
Midlands, Southern and Connaught-Ulster (see Figure 1 in 
O'Riordain & van Egeraat in this issue). The main motivation behind 
this merger appears to be the desire to save money. No rationale on 
regional planning grounds is provided for the delioeation of the new 
regions, the boundaries of which have been determin.ed by the need to 
provide a degree of continuity with the existing arrangements for 
monitoring EU Structural Funding (like the RAs and regional 
assemblies, the new regional entities essentially comprise a token 
response to the EU desire that there be some regional governance 
structure in place to monitor, aod advise on, the functioning of the 
EU-funded regional operational programmes). The existing NUTS3 
regions, while being composed of medieval counties which have little 
relevaoce to the spatial configuration of the modern economy, still in 
most cases approximate to some extent to the functional hinterlands 
of the gateway centres. The proposed new regions bear no relationship 
to the gateway regions aod mark ao abandonment of any pretence at 
replicating the city-region structures which underpin the ESOP or, 
indeed, actual regional development planning practice in most other 
advaoced economies. 
More importaotly, the new regional structures make no attempt to 
address the key governaoce weakness which undermined the NSS, i.e. 
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the absence of mechanisms for effectively mobilisiog regional actors 
around shared visions and strategies for the development of their 
regions. The main regional development function envisaged for the 
new regional assemblies is preparing and monitoring the 
implementation of regional spatial and economic strategies. While the 
action programme states that 'relevant agencies' will be required to 
adhere to these strategies, it is not stated how this will be enforced. 
This replicates the existiog situation, noted by Forfas in its 2010 report 
on regional competitiveness, that there are no mechanisms io place to 
ensure adherence to the regional planning guidelines prepared by the 
RAs (Forfas, 2010). It is also worth noting that the NSS stated that 
government departments and agencies would be required to comply 
with the NSS objectives, but this never happened. 
It is therefore difficult to take seriously the claim made by the 
action programme that the proposed new regional assemblies 'will be 
capable of providing appropriate overarching regional structures to 
oversee important elements of a regional development agenda, to 
comply with Government policy set-out io the National Spatial 
Strategy' (Department of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government, 2012, p. 96). 
The continuiog lack of organising capacity at regional level, which 
is an ioevitable outcome of the new proposals, might not be such a 
problem had the action programme substantially strengthened the 
ability of the local authorities to perform this organisiog function. 
This, as iodicated earlier in the paper, would require the government 
to devolve a substantial range of functions to the local level and to 
confer on local government the ability to apply leverage to remaioing 
central functions as they operate at local level. Unfortunately, the 
action programme does none of this. While it provides cogent 
arguments in favour of devolution of functions and repeatedly 
expresses a commitment to achieve this at some stage io the future, the 
document contains no definite and timetabled devolution 
commitments. This contrasts with the very real steps already taken by 
the present government to remove from local government several of 
its existing functions, namely control of the public water supply 
service, responsibility for vocational education and administration of 
the higher education grants scheme. 
In this context it may be worth noting that, io the preparation ofthe 
action programme, all government departments were requested to 
identify functions and services which they currently performed 
centrally and which could potentially be devolved to local government. 
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The action programme document records no response to this request 
from the Departments of Education and Skills; Health; Social 
Protection; Children and Youth Affairs; Communications, Energy and 
Natural Resources; Defence; or Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation. Th 
give them their due, the Department of Agriculture, Food and Marine 
did manage to identify one function capable of being devolved to the 
local level, the function in question being responsibility for coastal 
navigation aids! 
The action programme also devotes a considerable amount of space 
to strengthening the economic development role of local authorities 
but, apart from a redistribution of functions already performed at local 
level, it is difficult to identify in the document any specific functions 
transferred from central to local government or any meaningful new 
functions assigned to local government. For example, the proposed 
new local enterprise offices will deal only with microenterprises 
employing fewer than ten people. Larger firms will continue to be the 
responsibility of national agencies. In other countries, the role of local 
government in enterprise development is much more developed and 
sophisticated than what is envisaged in the Action Programme for 
Effective Local Government. 
Conclusion 
In a recent publication the OECD (2012) examined the growth 
performance over the period 1995-2007 of twenty-three regions from 
across the OECD, all of which had levels of per capita GDP below 
their respective national averages at the beginning of the period. Of 
these, twelve experienced above-average - and eleven, below-average 
- per capita GDP growth over the period. One of the most common 
features of the more successful regions was their 'deliberate adoption 
of a "horizontal" approach to regional development focused on better 
co-ordination of sectoral policies and mobilisation of local assets and 
resources rather than reliance on external supports' (OECD, 2012, 
p. 9). By contrast, less-successful regions tended to be characterised by 
an uncoordinated and fragmented top-down sectoral approach whose 
individual policy interventions are conducive to 'unintended and 
undesirable' effects. 
This distinctive approach ofthe successful regions was found to be 
underpinned by 'sound institutions for policy-making and governance', 
whereas the opposite tended to apply in the case of the under-
performing regions: 
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the quality of institutions emerged as a key issue in both 'j 
successful and under-performing regions - institutional 
bottlenecks were identified in nine case studies and 
improvements to institutions cited as factors supporting growth 
in eight others. Thus, governance matters... catch-up growth 
cannot be achieved via a top-down, subsidy-based approach. It 
requires a co-ordinated effort at regional level to identify local 
assets and remove the policy and other barriers to their 
mobilisation. A mix of top-down and bottom-up initiative is 
therefore needed, and the case studies suggest that success is 
most likely when the bottom-up element is strengthened. 
(OECD, 2012, p. 11-12) 
These findings provide a clear signpost to where Ireland should be 
moving in pursuit of sustainably successful, long-term regional 
development. Previously lagging regions in other advanced economies 
have been pulling themselves up by the bootstraps by focusing on 
building regional self-reliance from within, through forging broad-
based development coalitions working to shared strategic objectives 
and armed with the instruments and capacities to effectively pursue 
these objectives. This article has sought to demonstrate that Ireland's 
regions suffer from their profound lack of the kind of institutions and 
governance structures which have been shown to be key drivers of 
successful development elsewhere. This deficiency was a crucial factor 
in the abject failure of the NSS. 
Unfortunately the government's so-called Action Programme for 
Effective Local Government fails to address these fundamental defects 
in Ireland's structure of sub-national government. The proposed 
regional structures are devoid of effective functions and, in spatial 
terms, are at odds with the city-region approach considered to be most 
appropriate for promoting regional development elsewhere. More 
importantly, and contrary both to commitments made in the 
programme for government published by the present government 
upon assuming office and to arguments advanced in the action 
programme itself, the action programme makes no proposals for the 
devolution of additional functions and powers to the regional and 
local levels. This leaves regional and local government in Ireland 
without the leverage or leadership capacity which has played a key role 
in mobilising regional actors in support of the development effort in 
other OECD countries. 
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